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Response to Essays in PEGS SymposiulD on The Place of Families:
Family Life, the Politics of the Family, and Social Transformation
Linda C. McClain
Why do families matter? Why is the premise that strong
families are a foundation of a strong polity a staple in politi
cal rhetoric, even as the politics of the family remain divisive?
I address these questions from the vantage point of political
theory and law in The Place of Families,' Fostering Capacity,

policies, reasonable feminist critiques simply cannot hope to
prevail against arguments rooted in ideology Shanley suggests
that what is needed is nothing short of a radical (and unlikely)
transformation from the ideology of consumerism and capital
ism to a more socialist perspective that better recognizes human
interdependency Finally, Lopez contends that my formative, or
transformative project, of promoting sex equality flies in the face
of constraints dictated by our human nature, and particularly, our
sexual natures as women and men,

Equality, and Responsibility, My book offers a framework for
thinking about the relationship between family life and political
life and often contested issues of family law and policy I appre
ciate the forum this journal is providing for an exchange about
my book with political theorists and political scientists and thank
the contributors for their commentaries,
The Place of Rights
Canvassing the various commentaries reveals both com
My book, as Shanley observes, answers the question, "why
mon themes and diverse reactions, My responseJ' wi II first
do families matter?" by emphasizing
highlight interconnections and then
the formative role of families in pro
respond to some specific points of
If one accepts, as r do, a principle
ducing
citizens capable of democratic
each contributor- First, the normative
Qf some public responsibility to meet
and personal self-government and how
vision that I advance about the place
human needs, including the needs of
that formative role justifies society's
of families is rooted in core liberal and
childl-en. then we do not re(v only on
support of families, She comments,
feminist principles, Professors Nancy
families to meet such needs. Assessing
however, that a rights orientation would
Hirschmann, Jyl Josephson, and Mary
whether or notfamities are/ailing
be another way to frame the issue that
Lyndon Shanley are in basic agreement
requires a bmader examination Qf
is consonant with my approach, but
with this normative vision, By contrast,
failures ofpublic re5pol1sibility.
different in emphasis, Why not speak
Manuel Lopez questions whether my
about the rights of children to the pre
normative vision is either possible or
conditions for stable family relationships and the rights of adults
good, Second, I identify providing care and fostering civic virtue
to form and maintain family relationships and the preconditions
as two of the basic functions that families serve in what I call
for sustaining these various rights? Children, as Shanley points
a formative project of fostering democratic and personal self
out,
have needs, vulnerabilities, and interests, For many adults,
government Shanley and Josephson concur with this formative
procreating and parenting are vital parts of a conception of a
role, while Hirschmann offers skepticism about whether fami
good life,
lies produce social-rather than personal-values and whether,
as they actually function, families are seedbeds of civic virtue
I agree that rights have a place, A focus on what children need
rather than of civic vices,
and deserve-and how this translates into claims to rights-is a
useful way to consider the practical as well as political signifi
Third, the need for and obstacles to social transformation is
cance of families. My notion of a formative project builds this
a theme common to the diverse responses, All four contributors
into "fostering capacity." Just as I focus on capacity, Shanley
identify certain obstacles to achieving the sort of family law and
(drawing on Peggy Cooper Davis's work on the legacy of slavery
policy I champion, although they locate these constraints rather
for current family policy!) stresses the capacity to form a family
differently Hirschmann suggests that, like other feminists, I
and governmental responsibility to help people form and main
direct my attention toward-and am overly sanguine about-the
power of the state to bring about fundamental reform, while a
tain parent-child relationships. Of course, it bears noting that a
rights orientation does not, in and of itself, quell controversies
better strategy would ~e for women to pressure men to change
over family law and policy. Disagreements over what kind of
their behavior- Josephson cautions that while my arguments
family children need, over how to define parenthood, and over
carefully and rationally critique conservative arguments and
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FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY
who should have access to assisted reproductive technology are
easily framed in the language of children's rights.
Shanley's commentary suggests a possible reading of my book
that I would reject: that families matter only because of their role
in social reproduction. This might suggest that families warrant
attention only because they serve the state by producing respon
sible future citizens. Families also matter to the persons who
make up families: there are many personal goods associated with
family. My book notes the personal and political dimension of
the family both as individual experience and social institution.
Finally, Shanley stresses the constraints of the "neo-liberal
political culture of our day," capitalism and consumerism, and
identifies the need for a radical transformation. To wit, she
doubts that the vision of families that I elaborate is possible
without the emergence in the U.S. of a more explicitly socialist
perspective and general recognition of human interdependence.
Feminists (including myself) often find instructive models in
the more generous family policies of European social welfare
states. At the same time, some incremental progress is possible
and worth seeking.

I share with Hirschmann an interest in egalitarian marriage.
The Place of Families argues that equality within marriage has
an important relationship to marriage quality (endorsements for
Coleman's book seem to agree). Public policy, as Hirschmann
notes, has made egalitarian marriage more possible by fostering
women's greater economic independence and, hence, greater
wiJlingness to exercise an exit option from marriage. My book
identified concrete reforms in family law and developments in
constitutional law that have facilitated women's equal citizenship
and repudiated the common law model of marriage as a gender
hierarchy in favor of marriage as an equal partnership. Laws
drafted in gender-neutral terms, like the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA), aim to facilitate mothers and fathers (or
female and male care givers) assuming care taking responsibili
ties without sacrificing employment. That men take leave far less
than women signals that the FMLA has been a necessary but not
sufficient step to address this work/life issue. I believe that public
policy has an ongoing role to play in structuring institutions in
ways that encourage gender equality, but Hirschmann usefully
reminds us that the state may not be an effective or appropriate
catalyst to bring about certain forms of behavioral change.

The Trouble With Men
Shanley and Hirschmann both question whether my affinna
tive vision of societai recognition and support for care as a public
value has any chance of implementation, under current social
conditions. Hirschmann's critique pushes in a strikingly different
direction. She questions whether the proper feminist response is
to seek governmental action, rather than for wives and mothers
to insist that husbands and fathers change their behavior. What,
realistically, can the state offer to take the place of inadequate
spousal help? Women, she contends, need to insist on change.
Moreover, they may have the power to do so. She makes the
intriguing observation that men's "inessentiality" to the family
becomes more apparent as government takes on certain sup
port roles and facilitates women's economic citizenship through
policies like anti-discrimination laws. Hirschmann suggests that
women should use their leverage to get the point across that if
men wish to keep their membership in families, they need to
"start pulling their weight."
Hirschmann's contention that perhaps what feminists identify
as a policy problem is really a problem of power dynamics and
persuasion has some merit. That men make excuses for not doing
their fair share as fathers and husbands, and that women can moti
vate men to change is a basic premise of "how to" books sllch as
Joshua Coleman's The Lazy Husband: How To Get Men to Do
More Parenting and Housework 2 So too, Hirschmann raises a
pair of useful questions: how are men to be persuaded to change,
and how are women to be persuaded to insist on that change?

Seedbeds of Civic Virtue or Vice? Or, the Private
Pleasures of Parenthood
Hirschmann advances another line of cntlque. My book
stresses the formative role of families in fostering responsible
citizenship, but do families really deserve all the glowing rheto
•
ric about being seedbeds of civic virtue? Do we really think par
ents are serving the state, rather than themselves, when they rear
children? The pleasures (and pains) that parents derive from their
children cannot, Hirschmann observes, be translated into social
values. Moreover, families may simply be "seedbeds" of selfish
rationalization! Do families really deserve all the privileges that
the state provides them?
This skepticism about the formative role offamilies is a famil
iar argument raised by some feminist legal theorists (e.g., Mary
Anne Case, whom Hirschmann cites) about whether the social
reproduction argument really holds water. One argument rejects
the idea that society really.depends on procreation and parent
hood at all: the U.S., on this view, could produce plenty of future
workers simply tJu·ough more liberalized immigration policies.
Hirschmann's argument takes a different form: there is no guaran
tee that families will produce virtuous citizens rather than intoler
ant ones, and therefore, it is not clear that parents are producing
something that benefits their fellow, nonparent citizens.
Appeals to social reproduction, Hirschmann suggests, invite
a quality control or accountability argument: if families deserve
support because of what they do for the state, then what may the
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state do to ensure that they are actually producing responsible
future citizens? One might formulate this in a communitarian
way: if society entrusts parents with certain rights and concrete
entitlements, then what may it reasonably expect in terms of
responsibilities and social contribution?
The notion of investing in human capital certainly resonates
with my idea of fostering capacity. If one is looking at the care
taking role of families, then one could assess outcomes by look
ing at how children are faring, in terms of basic indicators like
nutrition, education, health, and the like. Meeting the basic needs
of children should be done, whether or not it directly fosters their
good citizenship. But if one accepts, as I do, a principle of some
public responsibility to meet human needs, including the needs
of children, then we do not rely only on families to meet such
needs. Assessing whether or not families are failing requires a
broader examination of failures of public responsibility.
If one looks at the civic dimension, one could look at attitudes
children are developing. But even so, if the values that children
are internalizing are ones that could be regarded as inimical to
democratic values, then parental success does no.t mean suc
cess in producing democratic virtues. This is a puzzle my book
addresses. Our constitutional scheme harbors a liberal expec
tancy that the values inculcated in families and other institutions
of civil society will be congruent with democratic values, but it
also recognizes that they may not be. 3 The recognition of a fun
damental parental right-and responsibility-to direct children's
lives rests on a premise that the state does not have a right to
standardize its children. 4
In liberal theory, some argue that the freedom to form, pursue,
and act on a conception of the good life without governmental
coercion includes the freedom to be a couch potato and to choose
not to develop fully one's capacities 5 Liberals recognize a right
to make incorrect or unwise choices. One rationale is a Millian
noninterference point: so long as my being a lay-about is not
harming others, this must be regarded as part of a zone of indi
vidualliberty.6
But when the issue is parental direction of the lives of chil
dren, immediately we seem to move out of the simple Millian
boxes of self-regarding and other-regarding actions (as Mill him
self insisted). If nothing else, children are affected by the deci
sions and direction of their parents; society is, as well. Our fed
eral constitutional scheme holds that parents have a fundamental
liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children,
on the premise that they will naturally pursue the best interests
of their children. Rhetoric about the domain of family as one
that the state may not enter suggests a shield against state intru
sion. However, as The Place of Families pointed out, the family
is not immune from governmental regulation. Government itself
has authority to foster the healthy development of children and

70

The Good Society

to regulate to pursue their best interests. One answer that my
book offers to Hirschmann's concern about parents producing
less-than-virtuous children is that the state properly plays a
compensatory/complementary role in shaping children through
measures such as education and through promoting important
constitutional and public values. It is consistent with commit
ments of liberalism and feminism to fostering capacity, equality,
and responsibility to identify an educative role for the state in
informing persons intending to become parents about the needs
of children and the responsibilities of parents. Indeed, I would
support education of adolescents in relationship skills, family
life, conflict resolution, and the like. Whether the state is the best
provider of such education, or whether it should enlist the insti
tutions of civil society to do so, is a fair question. The turn, in
recent years, to public-private partnerships to carry out various
formative projects illustrates this recognition of the importance
of civil society.
Finally, in arguing that family members get things from each
other that are not directly passed on to the state, such as laughter,
love, vacations, and the like, Hirschmann questions the rationale
for state compensation of parents when childless fellow-citizens
will not get these positive psychic benefits. She asks if I am
arguing that every adult should have and raise children, that
families must by definition contain children, and that only fami
lies count as the locus of citizenship. If so, she worries that my
focus on the family may end up "displacing the individuals who
make up the civil society." As she surmises, this sort of move is
not consistent with a commitment to liberal diversity and I do not
make it. The Place of Families, like some other liberal feminist
work on the family, is corrective: it invites greater attention to
the significance of the formative role of families in creating the
individuals spoken of within liberal theory. Other institutions
of civil society also playa role in shaping individuals and that
fOl'mative process is one I have begun to address in other work.
Membership in families is not the only associational good that a
good society would foster. The Place ofFamilies did not attempt
to offer a general account of civil society, or of how to situate
families within civil society, but that was not because I believed
those forms of associational life were not important, either for
their personal or public dimensions.

Marriage Partisanship, Marriage Promotion, and the
Limits of Liberalism
I thank Josephson for her careful engagement with my book
and for locating it in the tradition of Susan Moller Okin's work,
Justice, Gendel; and the Family,? I am honored by her charac
terization of my book as a "more deeply elaborated and nuanced
update" of Okin's argument. Josephson wonders, however, just
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how far a liberal analysis can get when the topic is the family,
since "it is in our intimate lives with others that we are least like
the independent, autonomous selves of liberal ontology." She
seems to accept that liberal ontology, in the sense of a commit
ment to rights, is a necessary condition for human dignity and
self-determination, but not a sufficient one. I agree with her.
Moreover, while she views my book as primarily addressing a
non feminist audience, such as social conservatives and persons
in the marriage movement, it also aims to persuade feminists that
liberalism is not an empty tool box when it comes to analyzing

movement's goal is to teach gender appropriate-traditional-roles
in marriage. But at least some prominent voices in the marriage
movement do advocate gender equality, in terms of equal rights and
responsibilities of spouses and parents.
I have considerable sympathy with Josephson's concerns
over whether marriage promotion could be combined with
protecting low-income women, men, and children from abuse
and violence within families. No doubt, the consistent lobby
ing by feminists and advocates for poor women has made sure
that marriage promotion law addresses domestic violence.

family. By advancing a relational model of autonomy, draw
Josephson is lightly concerned over whether it does so ade
ing on feminist work on the situated self, I seek to address the
quately. But I would note several points. First, the Department
of Health and Human Services has built into the definition of
feminist critique of liberalism as atomistic. And in crafting an
"healthy marriage" the premise that domestic violence is not
account of toleration and permissible regulation of the family
part of such marriage. 8 Second, the legislation requires that
that accepts core feminist points about the public significance
of the problems of an unjust division of labor and of domination
marriage promotion programs indicate how they will address
and abuse in the family, I seek to address the feminist critique
domestic violence. Third, one hopes that policy makers will
that liberal rights are an illusion.
heed the findings of researchers (commissioned by the federal
government) that domestic violence is an obstacle to stable
Concerns over problems of inequality, domination, and vio
lence are one reason that Josephson worries that I am too much
family life for some low income, unmarried parents and that
marriage promotion is not appropriate in such contexts. Fourth,
of a marriage partisan and too ready to embrace a governmental
relationship education, to the extent it aims to train people
role in promoting marriage. No doubt, I could have devoted
about nonviolent means of conflict resolution, might exert
more time in my book to explicating the many feminist critiques
some positive influence on changing attitudes and behaviors
of marriage promotion and of social conservative thought, more
that spill into violence.
generally. In a sense, the book takes as a given that, for better
or worse, relationship education and governmental promotion
Economic inequality is another obstacle to marriage. I con
of marriage are part of the current policy landscape. It argues
cur with Josephson that we should pay greater attention to how
about how core constitutional and political commitments to
economic inequality shapes access to family life. The U.S. is
experien~ing a "marriage gap," whereby marriage seems out of
equality and concerns for fostering equality within and among
reach to low income and working class citizens and more readily
families should inform those policies. It criticizes the marriage
available to the affluent because of the perception that healthy
movement as well as federal programs linking welfare reform
marriage requires certain economic preconditions. If so, then
to promoting "healthy marriage" and "responsible fatherhood,"
this is a matter of social justice that warrants attention.
both because they ignore the broader spectrum of obstacles that
Finally, Josephson raises a question posed by some other
low-income parents face and because they are, at best, ambiva
reviewers of my book: why should
lent about gender equality.
marriage, even the updated, more egal
That said, Josephson and I differ on
f support, on liberal and feminist
itarian form I support, be maintained?
whether marriage is properly govern
grounds, the proposition flwt gov
Why not try different approaches to
ment's business. I support, on liberal
ernment has a proper role to play
governmental regulation and support
and feminist grounds, the proposition

in educating citizens with re,"pect to

of intimate affiliation? In part, my
that government has a proper role to
fami~y fije, marriage, and relation
answer is pragmatic: marriage carries
play in educating citizens with respect
ships more generally. And 1 beLieve
a symbolic and practical weight as a
to family life, marriage, and relation
that government has a proper role in
way of organizing intimate life. The
ships more generally. And I believe
.!c)stering the preconditions for per
litigation over access by same-sex
that government has a proper role in
sons to form and sustain family liJe.
couples to marriage (which I support)
fostering the preconditions for persons
to form and sustain family life.
has brought to the fore the myriad
Josephson also regards as naive my idea that government
practical benefits and protections tied to marriage. My book
could provide relationship education to poor women in a way that
also proposes developing a registration system that would
promotes gender equality, since, on her analysis, the marriage
offer forma) support and recognition for intimate relation-
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ships other than marriage, including ones not involving
sexual intimacy.

Does Fostering Sex Equality Defy Human Nature
and Corrupt Love and Marriage?
Lopez argues that much of the beauty of the world up to now
has been tied up with recognizi~g and promoting sex difference
and inequality, unjust as this may be, and that the sort oftransfor
mative project I propose threatens to corrupt "our most private
and precious goods, romantic love and the family." It is hard
to respond to this thesis when we seem to see the world so dif
ferently. I would situate Lopez's critique within the context of
arguments that the feminist project, generally, is a form of social
engineering that does not adequately reckon with the constraints
of human nature. Specifically, he asks whether my project of
fostering sex equality is either possible or good. r would turn
the same questions back to him and ask whether accepting and
institutionalizing sex inequality is possible or good.
First, the appeal to human nanlre. Lopez accut:ptely reports
that my book expresses "skepticism about appeals to 'nature'
or to 'sex differences" as a justification" for policies because
of the historic role of such distinctions in restricting women's
citizenship. I note the emergence of sex equality as a constitu
tional norm and contemporary public value. Lopez seems criti
cal of this development, suggesting we should want to know
"whether the law is sound or just, and whether this norm really
is good." Fair enough. I take it that his project would be to
determine what constraints our sexual natures place upon social
arrangements. And then perhaps he would offer an account of
how much of the .current constitutional commitment to equal
protection and, in family law, to equal rights and responsibili
ties of spouses and parents would be rejected as contrary to our
natures.
Sex inequality, as a social system that allocates privileges
differently to men and women, may have inspired some great
works of literature, as Lopez suggests, and r yield to none in
being a fan of Jane Austen. However, to interpret this injustice
as a kjnd of beauty must surely depend upon the vantage point
of the assessor. The fact that Elizabeth Bennett, witty heroine of
Pride and Prejudice, triumphed in the marriage market by get
ting an adoring and wealthy Mr. Darcy (properly humbled by her
good influence) does not lessen the injustice of the social system
that entailed the family estate away from any female heirs and
in favor of the unctuous Mr. Collins. The quiet desperation of
the widow and daughters in Sense and SenSibility, who have to
leave their family home in favor of the male heir, hardly seems a
thing of beauty. That the sisters manage to marry and at least one
marries financially well may show how females could triumph
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within the confines of the social system, but surely those sisters
might have looked with envy to Emma, "handsome, clever, and
rich, with a comfortable home and happy disposition," who could
declare that she had "none of the usual inducements of women to
marry.,,9 That she does marry for love, not economic necessity,
and that she appears to have a relative equality with her husband
who, to accommodate her father's attachment to her, will move
into her house, instead of the reverse, does not lessen the beauty
or grace of the story.
Lopez voices concern that love of equality can corrupt and
degrade romantic love and the family. Feminist reformers, rather
than seeing beauty in inequality, saw the corruption of domi
nation, the despotism that John Stuart and Harriet Taylor Mill
condemned. The reforms of family law over the last century
have targeted forms of inequality that flowed from the common
law model of marriage. Where Lopez might see beauty, reform
ers saw hierarchy and tyranny in a legal model of marriage that
legally suspended wives' civil existence and gave husbands legal
authority to physically chastise wives, control their movements,
manage and dispose of their property, demand their household
services and earnings, and be exempt from the law of rape.
Courts and legislatures rationalized the husband's authority over
the wife and their separate spheres by reference to their different
natures and different destinies.
The contradiction between revolutionary principles of
equality and liberty and the common law model of marriage
was evident from the founding. As my book recounts, the evo
lution of the model of companionate marriage stemmed in part
from a premise that marriage should be based on a model of
mutuality rather than hierarchy. As separate spheres ideology
yielded to the family law reforms of the late 20 th century, an
ideal of marriage as an equal partnership emerged. Gender
based classifications came to be seen as rooted in outdated
or archaic stereotypes and the U.S. Supreme Court stressed
that the "pedestal" onto which women were placed by these
various restrictions was more of a cage. Is Lopez arguing
that dismantling this legally sanctioned hierarchy has been a
wrong-headed project? There was nothing "natura]" about this
hierarchy: it was legally and socially constructed. If Lopez
is questioning the soundness of this jurisprudence, how far
does his critique reach? How will studying human nature tell
us whether it is proper to have laws allocating to husbands
the right to choose the family's domicil~ or to manage family
property or whether such laws should yield to a model of equal
rights and responsibilities?
No doubt, the appeal to sex difference as an explanation, if
not justification, for many social practices continues. Lopez does
not discuss the recent interest in brain science and in differences
between male and female brains, but it offers a good illustra
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tion of the challenge of drawing normative implications from

ground on political values. This is not easy work, but i

sex difference. Recent sex scandals involving male politicians

worth attempting.

have sparked discussion about reasons for marital infidelity and

Second, it is undeniable that life scripts about marriage:

pointed to the brain chemistry of "alpha males." But even if these

family are in transition. On the one hand, marriage retain

claims had some foundation, would they justify or excuse such

special significance in law and culture for its symbolic mean

conduct?

and tangible consequences. On the other, people are departinl

my argument that sex equality is a core value to general "trans

Finally, to clarify what my project is and is not: Lopez links

many ways from the conventional script of love, marriage, •
baby carriage. I I As William Galston recently observed, for m,

formative political projects to establish sexual equality in defi

young people today, getting married and having a child-by

ance of nature," including a host of social changes tied to the

contrast to getting an education and securing employment-do

1960s and 1970s. Merely because my theory draws on liberal
political theory does not 1in1< it to this host of s.ocial phenomena

not signify achieving adult status in the way they did for
young people in earlier generations. 12 As the place of marriage

associated with a liberalizing of social attitudes about sexuality.

changes, society will face new challenges concerning family life,

Rejecting conservative sexual ideology that assigns women the

the politics of the family, and family policy.

role of sexual gatekeepers does not mean I simply champion
. male "modesty" by analogy to the female modesty championed
by proponents of reviving courtship. My point is that it is wrong
to assign women a special responsibility to control male sexual
ity, just as it is wrong simply to assume that men have little to no
control over their sexual conduct. Whatever men's nature, it is
appropriate for society to inculcate norms of respect for bodily

Linda C. McClain is the Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and
Professor of Law at BasIon University School of LaVo~ where
she teaches family law and feminist theoly. Her most recent
book is The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and
Responsibility (Harvard University Press, 2006) She is cur
rently working on a book, What's So Hard About Sex Equality?

integrity and to encourage men and women to deal with each
other with mutual respect. The fact that, from an evolutionary
perspective, male sexual jealousy may be an adaptive behavior,
which, when taken too far, spills over into lethal violence against
women hardly means that society may not attempt to prevent and
punish such violence.
Even some of the most ardent marriage promoters argue that
the advent of pair bonding and the institution of marriage are
momentous steps in human development, rather than simply
a natural state.lO As such, they are fragile achievements, and
require constant tending and shoring up by the forces of civil
society and law. An appeal merely to human nature, including
sexual nature, simply will not do the work that Lopez suggests it
can when it comes to marriage.

Conclusion: On Persuasion and the Place for
Marriage in (New) Life Scripts?
I will conclude with two brief points: one on persuasion and
the second on life scripts. It may be, as Josephson argues, that
efforts at reasoned argument fail to persuade when addressing
convictions rooted in ideology. Nonetheless, a premise of The

Place of Families is that it is possible to take the shared intu
ition that families matter and attempt to find some common
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